In the past two decades, sport researchers have examined a variety of moral variables, such as moral reasoning, prosocial and antisocial behavior, moral values, and moral disengagement (for reviews, see Kavussanu, 2007 Kavussanu, , 2008 Shields & Bredemeier, 2007) . Although research interest in sport morality has substantially increased, emotion has received surprisingly little attention, particularly given that emotions are considered important determinants of moral action (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Haidt, 2001; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) . In addition, much sport morality research has relied on self-reports, which are subject to a variety of motivational influences (see Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000) . The present study sought to address these issues by investigating moral identity and emotion in athletes using objective measures of emotion in an experimental setting.
Moral Identity and Emotion
Moral identity reflects the degree to which being moral is a defining or central characteristic of one's sense of self (Blasi, 1984) . Much of the recent work on this construct has been conducted by Aquino and his colleagues, who proposed a social cognitive model of moral identity. They defined moral identity as the cognitive schema one holds about his or her moral character (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009) and proposed that it is organized around a set of moral traits, such as being honest, caring, generous, and compassionate (Aquino & Reed, 2002) . A premise of this model is that people have many identities, but at any given time, they can be conscious of only a subset of them, known as the working self-concept (Aquino et al., 2009) . When moral identity is cognitively salient in the working self-concept, it is more likely to affect thoughts and emotions (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007) . The accessibility of moral identity within the working self-concept can be increased (i.e., moral identity can be activated) through priming, for example, by asking participants to write words that reflect the moral traits around which moral identity is organized and to write a story about themselves using these words (Aquino et al., , 2009 .
Moral identity is viewed as a strong source of moral motivation, that is, the motive to behave morally, due to people's desire to maintain self-consistency (Blasi, 1984; Aquino et al., 2009) . In empirical research, moral identity has been associated with moral behavior in a range of contexts. For example, individuals whose moral identity was central to their self-concept were more likely to donate food to the needy (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and less likely to report the intention to lie in a salary negotiation (Aquino et al., 2009 ). In the sport context, soccer players who reported high moral identity also reported less frequent antisocial behavior while playing soccer, such as diving to fool the referee, elbowing an opposition player, and committing a deliberate handball (Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006) ; they were also less likely to judge antisocial behaviors as appropriate. Thus, moral identity has been associated not only with moral behavior but also with moral judgment.
Moral identity has also been empirically linked to emotion. Specifically, Aquino, McFerran, and Laven (2011) found that undergraduate students with strong moral identity felt more compassion, inspiration, awe, and admiration (i.e., the emotional component of moral elevation) in reaction to a morally elevating personal experience and in response to reading a story of uncommon goodness. Moreover, experimentally primed moral identity led U.S. undergraduate students to experience somewhat stronger 1 emotional reactions to U.S. soldiers' abusive behavior of Iraqi prisoners, described in a newspaper article . That is, participants in the moral identity group felt somewhat more distressed, guilty, ashamed, and upset than those in a non-moral identity group. These findings suggest that individuals, whose moral identity is central to their self-concept, may be more sensitive to both positive and negative social behaviors of others, thereby responding to these behaviors with stronger positive and negative emotions, respectively.
Finally, some evidence indicates that individuals with a strong moral identity are sensitive to violations of fairness and respond to such violations with elevated physiological responses. Specifically, Boksem and De Cremer (2010) manipulated fairness in the ultimatum game-where one person divides an amount of money to be shared between two players and the other decides whether to accept the offer-and measured the medial frontal negativity, a pattern of brain activity observed when participants make mistakes or receive negative performance feedback (e.g., Gehring, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1990; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) . Participants who scored high on moral identity responded with larger medial frontal negativity to unfair offers. Thus, individuals with a strong moral identity appear to be more sensitive to violations of fairness.
Emotion and the Picture-Viewing Paradigm
A well-established paradigm for studying emotion in the laboratory is the pictureviewing paradigm, in which participants view affective pictures while physiological or self-report measures are obtained. This paradigm was popularized by Lang and colleagues (Lang, 1995; Lang & Davis, 2006) , who suggested that all emotions can be located in a two-dimensional space having coordinates of valence (ranging from unpleasant to pleasant) and arousal (ranging from low to high arousal). In their view, emotions reflect the engagement of neural structures and pathways in the two primary motivational systems of the brain: the appetitive system, which is expressed in behavioral approach, and the aversive system, which is expressed in behavioral avoidance. When individuals view pleasant pictures, the appetitive system is activated and they experience positive affect; when they view unpleasant pictures, the defensive system is activated, and they experience negative affect. Thus, affective valence is linked to the dominant motive system (appetitive or defensive), whereas affective arousal is reflected in the intensity of motivational mobilization.
Motivational priming theory (Lang, 1995; Lang et al., 1990) predicts that when one's motivational state is aversive, responses to other aversive cues are primed. Thus, a defensive withdrawal reflex elicited as a response to an aversive stimulus will be potentiated when one is in an unpleasant emotional state and attenuated when one is in a pleasant state. Such a reflex is the startle, which is typically elicited by a probe, that is, an unexpected and inherently aversive stimulus like a loud noise or a light flash. The probe elicits a defensive withdrawal response that can be assessed by the magnitude of the eye blink component of the startle reflex. In psychologically healthy people, the magnitude of this startle component is largest while viewing unpleasant pictures and smallest while viewing pleasant pictures (e.g., Lang & Davis, 2006; Schupp, Cuthbert, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 1997) . Because of its modulation as a function of one's affective state, the startle can serve as an objective measure of affective valence .
To date, only one study has examined the startle blink reflex in athletes during affective picture viewing. Collins, Hale, and Loomis (1995) asked athletes and nonathletes to view 27 pictures depicting pleasant (e.g., opposite sex nudes, food, children), neutral (e.g., neutral faces, household objects), and unpleasant (e.g., mutilations, snakes, aimed guns) scenes or objects while they elicited the acoustic startle blinks. The pictures were drawn from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang & Greenwald, 1988) . Consistent with motivational priming theory and related research Lang, 1995; Schupp et al., 1997) , unpleasant pictures produced significantly larger blink responses than pleasant pictures. Athletes and nonathletes did not differ in their blinks.
Another aspect of the startle response is the cortical event-related potential elicited by the startle probe. Studies that have elicited the startle using an acoustic probe have measured the N2, P2, and P3 event-related potentials (e.g., Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, McManis, & Lang, 1998; Schupp et al., 1997) . These represent brain activity in response to a specific event (Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008) and refer to the second negative (N2), second positive (P2), and third positive (P3) going brainwave peaks that occur after stimulus onset. The amplitude of these potentials is decreased by both pleasant and unpleasant pictures; thus, they are modulated by the arousal content of the picture (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 1998; Schupp et al., 1997) . It has been suggested that affective pictures that are high in arousal capture attention more, leaving fewer cognitive resources available with which to process the startle stimulus (e.g., Bradley, Harmby, Low, & Lang, 2007) .
The startle blink can also be elicited by painful electrocutaneous stimulation (Blumenthal, Cuthbert, Filion, Hackley, Lipp, & Boxtel, 2005; Kaube, Katsarava, Kaufer, Diener, & Ellrich, 2000; Williams & Rhudy, 2009) . In this case, the cortical response to the probe is known as the pain-related evoked potential (PREP; e.g., Katsarava, Ayzenberg, Sack, Limmroth, Diener, & Kaube, 2006) . The most commonly studied PREP is the N2-P2, which can be quantified as the difference between the N2 and P2 components (i.e., the second negative and positive peaks, respectively, of the cortical response to a noxious stimulus) and represents the cortical activity that results from processing a painful stimulus (Bromm & Lorenz, 1998) . The N2-P2 is potentiated when attention is directed toward the noxious stimulus and attenuated when attention is diverted from the stimulus (Lorenz & Garcia-Larrea, 2003) . Based on evidence that the midlatency evoked potentials (i.e., 100-400 ms after stimulus onset) elicited by electrocutaneous stimuli share many similarities to those elicited by acoustic stimuli (e.g., Tanaka, Inui, Kida, Miyazaki, Takeshima, & Kakigi, 2008) , the N2-P2 should be attenuated by unpleasant and pleasant picture viewing in a similar manner to the auditory evoked potentials (Cuthbert et al., 1998; Schupp et al., 1997) .
The Present Study
In sum, emotion in studies examining morality in sport has received very little attention. Emotion can be examined using the picture-viewing paradigm (see Lang & Davis, 2006) , in which physiological measures are obtained while individuals view unpleasant, pleasant, and neutral pictures. Because these measures vary as a function of affective valence and arousal, they can be viewed as objective indices of emotion. A variable linked to negative emotional reactions (to stories of prisoner abuse) and low antisocial behavior in sport is moral identity. The purpose of our study was to examine the effects of moral identity on emotion in athletes focusing on two components of the startle reflex that are known to vary as a function of one's emotional state: the startle blink, an objective measure of affective valence, and the N2-P2 PREP, which reflects cortical processing of the painful stimulus used to elicit the startle.
Our study adds to the literature on at least three accounts. First, it combines the social psychological experimental approach with the pictureviewing paradigm (Lang, 1995) ; thus, it represents a novel approach to examining the effects of moral identity on emotion. Second, it extends previous work on moral identity and emotion that has relied on self-reports by utilizing objective measures of emotion. Third, it extends research that has found a link between moral identity and antisocial sport behavior (Sage et al., 2006) by examining whether moral identity affects emotional reactions to pictures depicting such behavior. To investigate our study purpose, we used unpleasant pictures that depicted players from medium (i.e., soccer) or high (i.e., rugby) contact sports who were being hurt by another player or had been badly injured during play.
We hypothesized that moral identity would increase participants' sensitivity to depicted aggressive behavior and player suffering. This is because moral identity is organized around such traits as being caring, compassionate, fair, and kind (see Aquino & Reed, 2002) . Priming moral identity meant that participants would become more cognitively aware of these attributes, which, in part, define the moral self. Thus, we expected that moral identity would not only lead to stronger emotional reactions when participants view scenes of unfair behaviors (i.e., intentional injuries) but also increase compassion for the hurt players. Indeed, in past research, moral identity has been positively associated with empathy (Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti, & Gibbs, 2009; Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008) . Based on the above, we expected that moral identity would lead participants to experience a more intense negative emotional state during unpleasant picture viewing, as unpleasant pictures would be more aversive (see Aquino et al., 2007) . We hypothesized that this augmented negative emotional state would be reflected in larger blinks (Lang & Davis, 2006) and smaller PREPs (Cuthbert et al., 1998; Schupp et al., 1997) .
Method Participants
Ninety-four team-sport athletes (48 males, 46 females), with a mean age of 20.95 (SD = 2.72) years took part in the study. At the time of data collection, participants had been playing team sport on average for 8.51 years (SD = 4.31). Their main team sport was soccer (31%), hockey (26%), basketball (22%), rugby (18%), or water polo (3%). The sports from which participants were recruited were medium or high contact, in which the potential for injury is high and moral issues are salient (Bredemeier, Weiss, Shields, & Cooper, 1986) . In addition, participation in these sports has been associated with aggressive tendencies and higher frequency of antisocial sport behavior (Sagar, Boardley, & Kavussanu, 2011) . Athletes from a variety of contact sports were recruited to increase the generalizability of the findings. All participants were free from neurologic and psychiatric disorders as well as psychiatric and analgesic medications. They were asked to refrain from alcohol, caffeine, and smoking for at least 12 hr before testing and were paid £20 for participating in the study.
Picture-Viewing Task
The picture-viewing task comprised 63 color pictures. A series of 20 unpleasant, 20 neutral, and 20 pleasant pictures were presented in the experimental trials, with a further 3 pictures (one from each valence category) presented at the start as habituation trials. The unpleasant pictures depicted players who were being hurt by another player (e.g., elbowing one's opponent in the face, kicking them in the stomach) or had been badly injured (e.g., broken leg or ankle, face injury). Previous studies examining moral issues in sport have also used pictures depicting aggressive behavior in a variety of medium and high contact sports (Silva, 1983; Stanger, Kavussanu, & Ring, 2012a; Stanger, Kavussanu, Willoughby, & Ring, 2012b) and have shown that behaviors such as trying to injure an opponent occur in these sports (Kavussanu & Boardley, 2009; Sagar et al., 2011) . Thus, these pictures were relevant to all athletes who participated in this study. 2 Although we were primarily interested in emotional reactions to unpleasant pictures, we also included pleasant and neutral pictures to reduce habituation to the unpleasant pictures and to be in line with the picture-viewing paradigm (see Lang & Davis, 2006) . Most of the pleasant pictures depicted players celebrating victory or a goal; some pictures depicted comical scenes on the pitch and some semi-naked attractive players of the opposite sex. Finally, the neutral pictures depicted players standing, walking, running, dribbling, or kicking a ball.
These pictures have been used in another sample of athletes who were similar to our participants in terms of age, sex, and sport type participation (Stanger et al., 2012b) . In that study, using the Self-Assessment Manikin described below (Bradley & Lang, 1994) , the 20 unpleasant pictures were rated as unpleasant (M = 2.16) and high in arousal (M = 6.44), the 20 neutral pictures were rated as neutral (M = 5.19) and low in arousal (M = 3.15), and the 20 pleasant pictures were rated as pleasant (M = 6.82) and high in arousal (M = 5.75). The same picture presentation order was used for all participants. The pictures were presented in four blocks of 15, with 5 pictures per valence category per block that were ordered in a pseudo-randomized and counterbalanced fashion. Each picture was presented for 6 s with a variable interpicture interval (16-20 s).
Manipulation Check
In line with previous research (e.g., Benning et al., 2005; Williams & Rhudy, 2007) , we used the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) to measure the reported valence and arousal of each picture. Participants were asked to rate each picture using a scale displayed on the computer screen right after each picture. Ratings were made on 9-point scales ranging from very unpleasant (1) to very pleasant (9) for valence and from very calming / low arousal (1) to very exciting / high arousal (9) for arousal.
Startle Probe
We elicited the startle reflex using noxious electrical stimulation of the supraorbital nerve. We employed this method rather than the more widely used acoustic startle because compared with the acoustic stimulation (a) the probability of the blink response is higher due to the synchronous firing of afferent nerve fibers and (b) the blinks elicited are more resistant to habituation (Blumenthal et al., 2005) . In addition, many recent studies examining affective modulation of eye blinks and brain potentials have used this method (e.g., Kenntner-Mabiala & Pauli, 2005; Williams & Rhudy, 2007) .
A noxious electrocutaneous stimulus (intensity = 125% of pain threshold; M = 1.68, SD = 1.08 mA) was delivered as the startle probe using a nociception-specific concentric electrode designed to selectively activate A-delta fibers (Katsarava et al., 2006; Kaube et al., 2000) . Each stimulus consisted of a double pulse. Each rectangular wave pulse lasted 500 µs separated by 100 µs. This delay is below the threshold required to discriminate the two stimuli. Thus, they were perceived as a single stimulus. The stimulating electrode was placed on the supraorbital nerve above the left eye (Cuzalina & Holmes, 2005) , and a constant current stimulator (Model DS7A, Digitimer Ltd, UK) provided the stimulation. The stimulus was delivered at a variable interval (3-5 s) after picture onset on 90% of trials (18 per valence category). For 10% of trials (2 per valence category) it was delivered 8, 9, or 10 s after picture offset (i.e., during the interpicture interval) in a pseudorandomized and counterbalanced fashion. Thus, nerve stimulation occurred every 20-25 s.
Startle Blinks. The magnitude of the startle blink is typically measured by placing very small electrodes just below the lower eyelid, thereby monitoring orbicularis oculi muscle (Lang & Davis, 2006) , which is the muscle that closes the eye during a blink. We placed two miniature silver/silver chloride electrodes (E220X-LS, In Vivo Metric) below the lower lid of the left eye (Blumenthal et al., 2005; Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986) , thus obtaining an electromyogram (EMG) of the orbicularis oculi muscle that assessed the magnitude of startle blinks. The signal was amplified (× 10,000) and filtered (30-1000 Hz) using a Grass LP511 AC amplifier and recorded at 2500 Hz using Spike2 software (Cambridge Electronic Design Ltd, UK). Blink data were rectified offline and the amplitude was calculated as the average amplitude 10 ms either side of the maximum EMG activity (i.e., a 20-ms window) in a 50-to 100-ms post-stimulus window, relative to a 100-ms pre-stimulus baseline.
Pain-Related Evoked Potentials. The PREP is often measured as the difference in amplitude (in microvolts) between the second negative (N2) and positive (P2) peaks in the ERP following painful stimulation (e.g., Edwards, Inui, Ring, Wang, & Kakigi, 2008; Handwerker & Kobal, 1993) . Thus, we calculated this potential as the difference between the N2 (100-200 ms) and P2 (200-300 ms) peaks. Although the electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using a 32-channel BioSemi ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Netherlands), we focused on the Cz electrode, since this is where the N2-P2 potential is maximal (e.g., Katsarava et al., 2006) . Three electro-oculogram channels were also recorded to measure eye movements and blinks: Two electrodes were placed 1 cm outside the outer canthus of each eye and one below the right eye. The EEG was recorded at 512 Hz and was re-referenced to average earlobe electrodes offline.
Electrophysiological data processing was performed using EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) . The EEG was high-pass filtered using a finite impulse response windowed-sinc filter with a half-amplitude cut-off at 1 Hz and a 0.4 Hz transition band. Artifact rejection was carried out in two stages. First, epochs judged by visual inspection to contain excessive noise or paroxysmal artifact were removed. Then, independent components analysis was performed on the cleaned data to isolate eye movement, blink, and other artifactual components. These components were identified by visual inspection and removed. The evoked potentials were measured relative to a 100-ms pre-stimulus baseline and calculated as the average amplitude of the seven data points around the peak value during the 100-to 200-ms time window for the N2 and the 200-to 300-ms time window for the P2 (i.e., the peak value and the three data points either side, corresponding to a window of approximately 12 ms). The average numbers of artifact-free trials that were used to compute the N2-P2 potential were 17.83, 17.91, and 17.72, for the neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant picture categories, respectively. These numbers are in line with previous pain-related (e.g., Katsarava et al., 2006) and auditory (Cuthbert et al., 1998; Schupp et al., 1997) evoked potential research.
Priming Manipulation
We primed moral identity with a procedure that has been used in several other studies to prime moral identity (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) . We randomly assigned participants to either a moral identity group (24 men, 23 women) or a non-moral identity group (24 men, 23 women) and asked them to perform a writing task. All participants were presented with nine words and were instructed to copy, by hand, each word four times and write a short story about themselves using each of the words at least once. In the moral identity condition, the words referred to moral traits and were caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind. Asking participants to think about themselves in terms of these traits was expected to make moral identity more salient in their working self-concept because the traits are strongly associated with the moral self-schema .
The non-moral identity group performed the same task but used nine words that referred to positively valenced traits that were devoid of moral content: carefree, compatible, favorable, happy, harmless, open-minded, relaxed, respectable, and polite. One difference between this writing task and the one used by Aquino and colleagues (2007) is that we replaced one of their words (generally) with the word relaxed in this condition, as we felt the former did not refer to a trait. Asking these participants to write and use nine words devoid of moral content was not expected to activate a moral self-schema.
Manipulation Check
We used the manipulation check employed by Aquino et al. (2007) , who also primed moral identity. At the end of the experiment, participants indicated, on a scale ranging from 1 (to some extent) to 7 (to a great extent), how much the writing task reflected how they see themselves from the perspective of a moral person, a student, a member of an organization, and a safety-conscious person. Group differences were expected only for the moral person perspective . A 2 Group × 2 Sex analysis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed that the moral identity group (M = 5.62, SD = 1.33) provided higher moral ratings than the non-moral identity group (M = 4.91, SD = 1.62), F(1, 90) = 5.17, p < .03, η p 2 = .05. Cohen's d for the difference between the two groups was .48, which corresponds to a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992) . The two groups did not differ in the remaining three items, Fs(1, 90) = 0.26-2.72, ps = .10-.61, η p 2 s = .00-.03. Thus, the manipulation successfully increased the salience of moral identity in the moral identity group.
Procedure
Upon approval of the protocol by the university ethics committee, participants were tested individually. After the procedure was explained to them, they gave informed consent to participate and provided information about demographics and sport experience. Following instrumentation, their pain threshold was determined using an up-down staircase method. This familiarized them with the electrocutaneous stimulation and established the intensity of stimulation to be delivered during the picture-viewing task. After sitting quietly for 5 min, they were instructed about the picture-viewing task. They were told the following: (a) to always focus on the screen located 120 cm in front of them; (b) pictures would be presented occasionally-otherwise, a black cross would appear in the center of a white screen; and (c) their forehead would be stimulated when a picture or the cross was on the screen. Then, they completed the priming manipulation described above (which lasted about 10 min), followed by three habituation trials and 60 experimental trials. Noxious electrocutaneous stimuli were delivered as the startle probe to the supra-orbital nerve on all trials and measures of blinks were obtained. The N2-P2 PREP was also measured as described above.
Upon completion of the picture-viewing task, participants were asked to view the pictures again and rate them for valence and arousal. This provided a manipulation check of the affective pictures. In line with many previous studies (e.g., Benning et al., 2005; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993) , we collected the valence and arousal ratings after participants had already viewed the entire set of pictures. In doing so, we avoided contamination of the cortical recordings by participants making their judgments (by pressing buttons on a keypad) while a picture was presented or a noxious stimulus was delivered. Finally, participants answered the moral identity manipulation check questions.
Results

Picture Ratings Manipulation Check
To examine whether our sport-specific pictures elicited the anticipated valence and arousal responses, we performed ANOVAs on valence and arousal ratings with picture valence category (unpleasant, neutral, pleasant) as a within-subjects factor. The multivariate method was used for reporting the results of these analyses (Vasey & Thayer, 1987) . In this and all other analyses, significant category effects were followed by Tukey honestly significant difference (HSD) post hoc tests. Partial eta-squared (η p 2 ) is reported as a measure of effect size, with values of .02, .13, and .26 representing small, medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1992) . ANOVAs confirmed category effects for valence, F(2, 92) = 1000.83, p < .001, η p 2 = .96, and arousal, F(2, 92) = 216.06, p < .001, η p 2 = .82. Post hoc tests showed that valence ratings were lower (p < .001) for unpleasant than for neutral pictures, which, in turn, were lower (p < .001) than for pleasant pictures (see Figure 1A) . Arousal ratings of unpleasant and pleasant pictures did not differ from each other, but both were greater (ps < .001) than ratings of neutral pictures (see Figure 1B) . 
Moral Identity and Emotion
The purpose of this study was to examine whether moral identity influences the startle blink and the PREP during affective picture viewing. Although we were primarily interested in responses to unpleasant pictures, in line with the methodology used in the picture-viewing paradigm (see Lang & Davis, 2006) , we included picture category in our analyses. This allowed us to examine whether the effects of moral identity on physiological responses to the pictures differed as a function of picture valence. In these analyses, sex was also included as a factor because previous research has documented sex differences in the neural correlates of emotion (see Whittle, Yucel, Yap, & Allen, 2011) and in a range of moral variables, including judgments about the legitimacy of injurious acts, empathy, and antisocial behavior (e.g., Conroy, Silva, Newcomer, Walker, & Johnson, 2001; Kavussanu, Stamp, Slade, & Ring, 2009 ). Thus, we conducted Group × Sex × Category ANOVAs, with group (moral, nonmoral) and sex (male, female) as between-subjects factors and picture category (unpleasant, neutral, pleasant) as a within-subjects factor to examine the effects of moral identity on the eye blink and N2-P2 PREP while participants viewed unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant pictures.
Startle Blink. We performed the analyses on the startle blinks on a subsample (n = 57) of participants, who showed at least 20 blinks (as assessed by visual inspection) during the picture-viewing task. The reduction in the original sample size was due to amplifier saturation by the electrocutaneous stimulation and habituation of the startle blink response. In this analysis, the moral identity group included 15 males and 16 females, while the non-moral identity group included 11 males and 16 females. The average number (percentage) of trials with blinks was 42.78 (71.29%).
The Group × Sex × Category ANOVAs yielded a group main effect, F(2, 53) = 5.47, p < .02, η p 2 = .09, and a group by category interaction effect, F(2, 52) = 4.52, p < .02, η p 2 = .15; there were no main or interaction effects involving sex. Inspection of the means revealed that the moral identity group displayed larger blinks (M = 41.05 µV) than the non-moral identity group (M = 23.08 µV). The grand average blink responses of the two groups can be seen in Figure 2 . To explore the significant interaction effect, first we compared the two groups within each picture category using between-subjects ANOVAs and then we compared the three picture categories within each group using within-subjects ANOVAs. Results of the between-subjects ANOVAs comparing the two groups showed that the moral identity group displayed significantly larger blinks than the non-moral identity group for all picture categories. These findings are presented in Table 1 . However, importantly, as Table 1 shows, the value of the probability p was smaller and the effect size associated with the Group factor was larger for unpleasant (p = .01; η p 2 = .11) than for neutral (p = .03; η p 2 = .08) or pleasant pictures (p = .05; η p 2 = .07). These findings indicate that the magnitude of the effect of moral identity on eye blinks was larger when athletes viewed unpleasant than when they viewed neutral or pleasant pictures. Within-group ANOVAs showed category effects only in the moral identity group, F(2, 23) = 3.43, p = .05, η p 2 = .23: Participants in this group displayed larger blinks (p < .02) while viewing the unpleasant than pleasant pictures. 
Discussion
The importance of emotion in regulating moral action has been highlighted by several authors (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Haidt, 2001; Tangney et al., 2007) . However, emotion in sport morality research has received very little attention. In addition, only one study to date has employed the picture-viewing paradigm to obtain physiological measures of emotion in athletes (Collins et al., 1995) . Although moral identity has been linked to antisocial sport behavior in cross-sectional research (Sage et al., 2006) , it has not been experimentally investigated in athletes. In this study, we investigated the effects of moral identity on athletes' physiological responses to pictures depicting players who were hurt by an opponent or were badly injured during play.
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Benning et al., 2005; Collins et al., 1995) , we first examined whether our sport-specific pictures were rated as anticipated. Our manipulation check results showed that unpleasant and pleasant pictures were rated as unpleasant and pleasant respectively, while the neutral pictures were rated as neutral. Moreover, arousal ratings were moderately high for pleasant and unpleasant and low for neutral pictures. Thus, valence and arousal ratings were consistent with those typically obtained in previous research (see Lang & Davis, 2006) and support work that has used these pictures in athletes (Stanger et al., 2012b) . These findings indicate that our pictures were appropriate for investigating our study purpose, namely, whether moral identity influences the startle blink and PREP in athletes while they viewed unpleasant pictures. We manipulated moral identity using a well-established manipulation (e.g., Aquino et al., 2007 Aquino et al., , 2009 Reed et al., 2007) and examined its effects on team sport athletes' physiological responses to unpleasant pictures depicting rugby or soccer players who were hurt by an opponent or badly injured during play. Although nearly half of our participants were also rugby or soccer players, the remaining indicated hockey, basketball, or water polo as their main team sport. Analysis involving these two subgroups 2 showed no significant difference in their physiological responses to the pictures and no differential effect of moral identity on physiological responses as a function of sport type. Thus, viewing pictures of hurt or badly injured athletes that are from one's own sport (versus another contact team sport) does not moderate the effects of moral identity on athletes' physiological responses to these pictures.
Moral Identity and Startle Blink
Consistent with our hypothesis, the moral identity group responded with larger blinks to unexpected painful electrical stimulation than the non-moral identity group while viewing unpleasant pictures. The startle blink is potentiated when one is in an unpleasant emotional state (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Schupp et al., 1997) . The larger blink in the moral identity group suggests that participants in that group experienced a more unpleasant emotional state than the non-moral identity group while viewing unpleasant pictures. Perhaps bringing moral identity to the working self-concept made these participants more sensitive to the content of our unpleasant pictures, which depicted hurt players. Individuals with a strong moral identity consider being caring, compassionate, fair, and kind important aspects of their self (Aquino & Reed, 2002) . The moral identity group may have felt compassion toward the injured players, thereby experiencing stronger emotional reactions to these pictures compared to the non-moral identity group.
Our findings are consistent with those of Aquino et al. (2007) , who found that the moral identity group had somewhat stronger negative emotional reactions to stories of prisoner abuse than did the non-moral identity group. They also extend their research by showing that moral identity affects physiological indices of emotion while athletes view unpleasant pictures depicting antisocial behavior in sport. This finding is important because emotion has been implicated in theories of moral action. For example, Bandura (1991) has proposed that transgressive conduct is regulated by the anticipated negative affective reactions to such conduct, and Haidt (2001) has suggested that our emotional state affects morally relevant judgments and behavior. Moral identity may accentuate the negative emotions athletes experience in relation to antisocial behavior in sport. If they find pictures of injured players aversive, they may be less likely to engage in antisocial behavior. This hypothesized link between emotion and antisocial sport behavior should be verified by future research.
An unexpected finding was that the moral identity group displayed larger blinks in response to the noxious stimulation than the non-moral identity group while viewing neutral and pleasant pictures. However, the difference between the two groups was not as large as it was in response to unpleasant pictures. One explanation for this finding may lie in the responses of the non-moral identity group: Blinks of this group did not differ among the three picture categories. The blink response is normally attenuated when one is in a pleasant emotional state (e.g., Bradley et al., 2001; Schupp et al., 1997) . The priming manipulation of the non-moral identity group, which entailed writing a story using positively valenced words (happy, carefree, relaxed, etc; see Aquino et al., 2007) , may have led this group to experience a positive affective state throughout the experiment. This may have been sufficiently intense to counterbalance the negative emotion that should have normally been experienced while viewing unpleasant pictures. Future research should examine whether this pattern of results is replicated if neutral words are used in the manipulation of the non-moral identity group (see Aquino et al., 2011 ).
An alternative explanation for the significant group differences in blinks across neutral and pleasant pictures is a potential carryover effect of the influence of moral identity from the unpleasant to the pleasant and neutral pictures. As hypothesized, moral identity led participants to experience a negative emotional state while viewing unpleasant pictures as reflected in their increased blink responses (see Lang et al., 1990 ). This heightened negative emotional state, may have been relatively long lasting, and seems to have been maintained during pleasant and neutral picture viewing thereby leading participants to exhibit larger blinks across all pictures. The three sets of pictures were presented in a mixed block design. Thus, unpleasant pictures were interspersed between pleasant and neutral pictures and carryover effects of the priming manipulation across the three picture categories are likely. Future research should examine whether moral identity influences the startle blink during neutral and pleasant picture viewing by using a fixed blocked design, in which pictures from only one valence category are presented in each block of trials.
Moral Identity and Pain-Related Evoked Potential
We hypothesized that moral identity would decrease the PREP elicited by the noxious stimulus during unpleasant picture viewing. Although this hypothesis was supported, the amplitude of the PREP was smaller in the moral identity than the non-moral identity group also during neutral and pleasant picture viewing. The amplitude of the PREP is reduced when attention is directed away from the painful stimulation (see Lorenz & Garcia-Larrea, 2003) . Moral identity was expected to lead participants to pay more attention to unpleasant pictures, thereby leaving less attentional resources available for the processing of the noxious stimulus, and consequently a reduced PREP. That the PREP was reduced in the moral identity group across all picture categories suggests that moral identity may have led participants to pay more attention to all pictures.
A potential carryover effect of moral identity from unpleasant to pleasant and neutral pictures could also explain this finding. That is, moral identity may have made participants more attentive while watching the unpleasant pictures and this heightened vigilance may have been maintained during pleasant and neutral picture viewing, leading them to pay more attention to all pictures. This may have resulted in fewer available resources to process the noxious stimulus and consequently a smaller PREP. Although a great deal of research has used the picture-viewing paradigm (see Lang & Davis, 2006) , to our knowledge, no study has experimentally manipulated a psychological construct to examine its effects on psychological or physiological responses during picture viewing. Thus, we do not know whether a generalized effect of moral identity on physiological responses across all picture categories (i.e., pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant) should be anticipated. The significant differences between the moral identity and non-moral identity group for both the blink and the PREP suggest that such a generalized effect across the three picture categories is likely.
Directions for Future Research
We recommend a number of avenues for future research. First, researchers could examine whether the effects of moral identity on emotion are the same in athletes and nonathletes. We do not have any reason to believe that these effects would be different in nonathletes; thus, our findings should be generalized to other people. However, this should be confirmed by future research. This is important because it could replicate our findings and determine whether they can indeed be generalized to nonathletes. Second, researchers could investigate the link between physiological measures of emotion during affective picture viewing and aggression. Specifically, following the picture-viewing task, participants could be offered the opportunity to act aggressively in an experimental setting. Those who respond with stronger emotional reactions to pictures of hurt or injured players may be less likely to behave aggressively. This is important because it will establish a link between emotion and behavior, which is what we ultimately try to understand.
Third, research has shown that basketball players differ from nonathletes in moral reasoning (e.g., ; thus, researchers could examine potential variation in emotional reactivity between athletes and nonathletes (cf. Collins et al., 1995) . This would provide evidence that contact-sport athletes are less sensitive to viewing injured players and can establish a link between sport type and moral emotion, thereby furthering our understanding of sport morality. Finally, in light of evidence that sports camp children use less mature moral reasoning when responding to sport than daily life moral dilemmas (Bredemeier, 1995) , researchers could investigate whether athletes respond differently to aggressive sport and nonsport pictures. Identifying differences as a function of picture context will further support the theory of bracketed morality , which suggests that morality in sport is distinct from morality in other contexts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we found that moral identity influences the startle blink and PREP in athletes while they viewed unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant pictures. This is the first study to show that moral identity influences emotion in athletes using physiological measures. This finding is important because it provides the first evidence to show that activating one's moral self-schema can affect emotion. Our findings extend previous work that has identified an inverse relationship between moral identity and antisocial behavior in sport (e.g., Sage et al., 2006) and the findings of Aquino et al. (2007 Aquino et al. ( , 2011 by providing stronger, objective evidence that moral identity affects emotion. Finally, our findings could have implications for morality in sport. The findings suggest that activating moral identity could lead to stronger negative emotional reactions to antisocial behavior, thereby potentially reducing antisocial behavior in sport.
Notes
1. The moral identity group's emotional reactions were 0.28 (on a 1-4 scale) higher than those of the non-moral identity group. Although this difference was not statistically significant, it is worth noting that one of the factors that influences statistical significance is the sample size (Cohen, 1992) , which was small (N = 69) in this study.
2. Separate 2 Group × 2 Sex × 2 Sport Type (high contact, medium contact) × 3 Picture Category ANOVAs yielded nonsignificant main effects of sport type for the blink response, F(1, 49) = 1.54, p = .22, η p 2 = .03, and the PREP, F(1, 86) = 0.33, p = .57, η p 2 = .00, as well as nonsignificant group by sport type interaction effects for both the blink response, F(1, 49) = 0.01, p = .92, η p 2 = .00, and the PREP, F(1, 86) = 0.37, p = .55, η p 2 = .00.
